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 A Thoughtful Profession is a fascinating and valuable book. The American Philosophical 
Association should be commended for having the good sense to commission a history of its origins, 
and James Campbell is to be thanked for having written an insightful history. In what does the value 
of the book consist? 
 First, over the years I have become increasingly convinced that to understand something one 
must have some sense of its history. This principle applies, I think, across the board, from social, 
political and economic phenomena to cultures, literatures and arts to the natural sciences, 
mathematics and logic. Even the latter, which we might think to be less temporal, have histories that 
inform their meaning and significance at any given point. The necessity of history, as we might call 
it, applies no less to scholarly disciplines and academic professions. One of the running themes that 
Campbell highlights in the years before and after the founding of the APA is the question of the 
nature of philosophy as a contemporary scholarly discipline. In that this topic is no less addressed 
today than a hundred years ago, the consideration of the history of the discussion helps us to frame 
the significance of the recent and current debate. 
 Second, this could have been a tedious book, that is if it were too institutionally focused. One 
could easily imagine a book that consisted largely of reprinted memos, letters, speeches and meeting 
agendas and programs. Campbell does describe many of the programs of the early meetings, but he 
does so in the context of the philosophical issues that were being debated. The focus of the book is 
not on the APA as an organization and the way it developed institutionally, but on the APA as the 
institutional expression of the nature of the discipline of philosophy in the US in the early 20th 
century, and the role the institution played in the pursuit of the philosophical issues that were then 
current. This choice of focus was a wise one on Campbell’s part because it affords us a glimpse of, 
or rather a sustained look at, the scholarly nature of the discipline at the time. The implication is that 
the nature of the scholarly activity is related to the institutional forms in which it is carried out, in 
this case to the evolving nature of the university and to such academic organizations as the APA. 
The result is an examination of philosophy in America in the early years of the 20th century that is an 
intellectually rewarding read. 
 The third reason the book is valuable for contemporary philosophers in the United States, 
and perhaps for those abroad as well, has to do with a point that some may find disconcerting but 
which I find to be both interesting and encouraging. As I have mentioned, Campbell focuses on the 
debates that were carried on around the formation of the APA that dealt with the question of the 
nature of the philosophical discipline itself. It seemed important for some American philosophers at 
the time to come to grips with the question of the purposes and methods of the discipline, if for no 
other reason than that they sought to describe the reasons philosophy merited a firm position in the 
university. Many were discomfited by the apparent fact that philosophy never seemed to make 
progress, that philosophers were dealing with many of the same general questions that had engaged 
thinkers for more than 2000 years. If philosophers could not agree on the questions to be asked, on 
research protocols, and on satisfactory answers when they appeared, how, they wondered, could the 
discipline command the respect afforded the sciences? 
 That this debate formed so much a part of the creation of the modern discipline of 
philosophy strikes me as rather comforting. For one thing, it indicates that the more recent debates, 
even battles, over the nature of philosophy and how it should be done, struggles that have been 
carried out in part within the APA, are not unique; they have a long tradition. One might take this as 
grounds for frustration in so far as it may appear that we have failed to resolve a critical problem. 
However, something else seems to me to be going on here, which is that self-reflection about the 
nature of the discipline is inherent in the discipline itself. It is an aspect of the philosophical 
enterprise that those of us who undertake philosophy continue to ask ourselves what we are doing, 
how we are to do it, and for what purposes it is to be done. This is not a failure of the discipline to 
be successful; rather it is an aspect, and a valuable aspect, of the nature of philosophical reflection. 
 The reasonableness of taking the situation this way is suggested by the fact that in this 
respect philosophy does not differ much from the other disciplines that constitute the modern 
university. Consider the questions that are occasionally asked by practitioners of other fields of 
inquiry: is history a science or a species of the humanities?; should political science be empirical or 
theoretical?; is economics in any reasonable sense a social science, given that economists disagree 
with one another so fundamentally?; is the study of literature a study of literary works or the study 
of theory?; does sociology have any proper subject matter?; what is the discipline of communication 
anyway?; are ethnic studies central or merely trendy?; is physics destroying itself by an excessive 
focus on string theory?, and so forth. Questions are also asked, with respect to all contemporary 
disciplines, about whether their practitioners should be disinterested inquirers or scholars with a 
serious interest in the application and social implications of our work? And we ask of the university 
itself whether the “ivory tower” is a defensible or detrimental metaphor? In short, the nature of all 
the disciplines that constitute the university, in fact the nature of the university itself, is under 
continual scrutiny. The discipline of philosophy is not exceptional in this respect. 
 Campbell makes clear in the book how much this sort of question bothered many of the 
founders of the APA, most clearly Arthur O. Lovejoy. But Lovejoy was mistaken, not just about 
whether philosophy should be a science, which is what he advocated, but about the assumption that 
philosophy needs to define itself more clearly and that its practitioners need to agree on a definition. 
It is not, I think, a failure of an academic discipline to entertain, even interminably, questions about 
its own nature and purposes. On the contrary, it is probably a strength in that it suggests the ongoing 
presence of new ideas, challenges, perspectives and possibilities. We should become nervous if such 
debates and disagreements were to cease. It may yet be the case that academic administrators and 
granting agencies and foundations need to be helped to understand this fact about scholarly inquiry 
and academic disciplines, but that simply means that our challenge is to help them understand it, not 
to try to redefine our activities according to a largely mythical conception of the progress of 
knowledge. 
 The fourth reason I have found the book so valuable is that it has helped me to understand 
that the manner in which philosophy is undertaken today, and the way in which the discipline 
organizes itself, are historical and geographical determinations. The current form in which 
professional philosophy is organized, with its roots in the early years of the APA, is the current way 
in which people in the United States with a philosophical bent can pursue their intellectual interests. 
With respect to geography, it would be interesting to have a similar careful study of how the 
profession of philosophy has developed in other places around the world. I suspect that there would 
be differences. Temporally, we can be certain that the current way in which philosophy is done and 
the discipline organized will change over time, either gradually or abruptly. But all the evidence 
suggests that however it changes, and whether or not philosophers ever agree on anything, people 
will continue to raise philosophical questions because that is just how we are. And if the APA were 
to disappear tomorrow, philosophers in the United States would, sooner rather than later, erect 
something in its place, for the simple reason that we want not just to do philosophy, but we also 
want to communicate with one another in some systematic way. 
 We are all very much in James Campbell’s debt for demonstrating so clearly and carefully 
how and why that systematic communication came to be a century ago. 
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